Table of Contents:

Foreword
Introduction
How This Book Came About

Part One: Early-Stage Play
   New School versus Old School
   Specific Guidelines for Accumulating Chips

Part Two: Endgame Strategy
   Introduction
   Basic Endgame Concepts
   Equilibrium Plays
   Kill Phil: The Next Generation
   Prize Pools and Equities
   Specific Strategies for Different Tournament Types
   Short-Handed and Heads-Up Play
   Detailed Analysis of a Professional SNG

Part Three: Other Topics
   Adjustments to Recent Changes in No-Limit Hold ’Em Tournaments
   Tournament Luck
   Playing Against Better Players
   Tells and Reads
   Tournament Preparation

Part Four: Online Short-Handed No-Limit Hold ’Em Cash Games
   Online Short-Handed
   No-Limit Hold ’Em Cash Games

Appendix 1
   Equilibrium Solution for Moving-In Far From the Money
Appendix 2
   Equilibrium Calling Strategies for Far From the Money
Appendix 3
   Assumed Rank Order for Pushing Hands
Appendix 4
   Assumed Rank Order for Calling Hands
Appendix 5
   Limitations of ICM
Appendix 6
   Resources

Index

Excerpt:

New School vs. Old School

Loose Aggressive
     Accumulating chips in big MTTs is an art form and different players have various ways of accomplishing this critical feat. Old-school practitioners play tight, waiting for big starting hands (about top 5%), such as pocket 9s or better, A-Q suited, or A-K (preferably suited), and try to extract as much as possible with these hands. They use bets and raises to define their hands. Aggressively playing sound values is the hall-mark of this approach. 
     Early in tournaments, however, other players are getting huge implied odds to play speculative hands, such as small to medium pairs and suited connectors. If they miss the flop, no big deal; the big pair wins a small pot. But when they flop two pair or better, they’re now in position to bust a player who falls in love with aces or kings and can’t get away from them.
     If this is what you’re patiently waiting for (you’ll get aces or kings on average only once every 110 hands), you naturally might want to extract full value and may be willing to go all-in with them. This is exactly what today’s predatory players are looking for. Get married to aces early in a tournament and you’ll often have a great bad-beat story to tell your friends. Actually, it’s not a bad beat at all, especially if you slow-play aces early on, as many players are prone to do. They’re just asking to get busted and plenty of players around to-day will happily oblige them. The number of players I see crippled or eliminated early in tournaments due to slow-playing big pairs is staggering. Unless you’re su-perb at reading hands and other players and have a great feel as to where you are in a hand, it’s probably a mistake to slow-play aces, especially early when most players are deep-stacked.
     In fact, sometimes drastically over-betting aces early in a tournament can pay off big time. A few years ago in the $25,000-buy-in WPT Championship event at Bellagio, where each player started with 50,000 chips, Jim McManus shoved in all 50,000 of his chips pre-flop with pocket aces. He was called by a player who had pocket queens and apparently thought they might be good, perhaps because no one in his right mind would bet 50,000 with aces when the blinds were tiny. When asked about this play, pro player Chip Jett responded, “I don’t see anything wrong with it. Aces aren’t part of my plan for accumulating chips anyway!” While Chip undoubtedly said this with tongue in cheek, it’s true that today’s new-school players aren’t dependent on big pairs to build a big stack.
     New-school practitioners play all kinds of hands in the early going in an effort to get their hands on some chips. Optimally, they do it with small-ball moves—small bets, raises, and re-raises that keep their oppo-nents off-balance and guessing. When a player is ca-pable of playing virtually any two cards, there’s nearly always a possible hand he could have that will bury you. In fact, new-school adepts, such as Daniel Negreanu, James Van Alstyne, Alan Goehring, Patrik Antonius, and Gus Hansen (to name just a few), consistently show their opponents improbable holdings to take down big pots. 
     Here’s an actual example from an April 2007 tournament at Bellagio.
   At the 50/100 (second level) of a $3,120-buy-in no-limit hold ’em event with 6,000 starting chips, Alan Goehring is the chip leader with 26,000 plus. Alan Cunningham, another great player, is second in chips at the table with about 13,000, more than double his starting chips.
     Goehring has been playing many hands and taking a lot of flops, even when there’s a raise before he acts. In this hand, Goehring limps under-the-gun (UTG) with 64 offsuit. Cunningham, seated three seats to the left of Goehring and holding A®K®, makes it 400. It’s passed around to Goehring now heads-up and out of position with a top player; Goehring calls! The flop comes 5-3-2 with two clubs and one heart, giving Goehring the nuts and Cunningham the nut flush draw with 2 overcards. Goehring checks, Cunningham bets around 700, Goehring raises to 1,600 or so, and Cunningham calls; the turn brings the 4´ and Goehring bets about another 1,600, taunting Cunningham to raise. Cunningham doesn’t bite, despite the fact that he now has a wheel (a 5-high straight) to go with his nut flush draw. The river is the jack of hearts; Goehring now bets about 6,000 and Cunningham, after some deliberation, calls.
This hand cost Cunningham 9,600, leaving him with only 3,400, and catapulting Goehring to more than 35,000 chips, nearly six times his starting stack, and it was still only the second level! 
     Playing a lot of hands when deep-stacked makes new-school adepts extremely hard to read and unpredictable. Not only is it problematic to put them on a hand (they can have anything), but they can also smell weakness and steal a lot of pots. Creating uncertainty in the minds of their opponents, they find ways either to induce a desired call or to blow opponents off of better hands, often amassing a mountain of chips in the process. In my view, the best players in the game today play some variant of this loose aggressive (LAG) strategy. 
     Also in my view, a large part of the credit for devel-oping this loose aggressive style goes to the Dane, Gus Hansen. Coming from backgammon, Gus thinks in terms of equity. He realized that there’s a vast difference between pre-flop and post-flop equity. Although AK is 67%/33% better than T3 (a hand now called “Hansen” by some) pre-flop, post-flop it’s about a 30%/70% underdog if either a 10 or a 3 flop without an ace or king. If the flop comes A-T-3, the AK is nearly a 3/1 underdog, but he has a hand that may be strong enough to play for all his chips. Since pre-flop raises are generally small relative to stack sizes early in a tournament, Gus reasoned that he could play a lot of hands, especially in position; if he hit an unsuspected hand, he could stack his opponent. 
     Friends of mine recall that in season one of the WPT, at the Five Diamond Tournament at Bellagio in 2002, top players were buzzing about Gus having played an estimated 70% of the hands on his way to victory.
     Other Scandinavians have followed in Gus’ foot-steps, further perfecting this style and taking it to new heights. The best around at this perspiring moment, in my opinion, is the Finn, Patrik Antonius. Patrik plays even more hands than Gus, has incredible focus, and is fearless and unpredictable. With a barrage of bets and raises, he puts tremendous pressure on his opponents. 
     Say you have AK early in a big tournament and raise it up to 200 in early position with blinds of 25/50. Antonius calls on the button. The flop is a pleasant Ac3d4h. You bet 400 into the 475 pot and get called. The turn is the innocuous-looking 2h. You bet 1,000 and Patrik, in his inimical fashion, thinks for about a minute and raises you 1,500. You’re pretty sure that if you call this bet, you’ll be faced with a decision for most or all of your remaining chips on the river. What to do? What could Patrik have here? Pocket 3s or 4s? A3? Ah6h? Actually, all of these hands are possible holdings and therein lies the rub. Against such players, you can’t safely eliminate most starting hands, and he’ll play very aggressively with a hand that may be second best at the moment, but can improve. So when he raises on the turn, you could be in mortal danger. That harmless-looking deuce might have made him a straight. Against more conventional players it would almost certainly be a blank, but Antonius is betting as though it helps him and his style prevents you from rul-ing out this possibility. You also know, and he knows you know, that he’s fully capable of pulling the trigger on the river, either with the goods or on a total bluff. It’s this uncertainty, combined with fearlessness, that’s the strength of his game. This style of play is characterized as loose aggressive. 
     Suddenly, your tournament life is on the line. Do you risk it all with top-pair top-kicker when an expert player is telling you with his betting that he’s got you beat? I’ve seen players move in in spots such as this with top pair, or an over-pair, and get called instantly and shown a set or a made straight. Exit stage left. 
     Playing against top new-school players who have position on you early in a tournament is similar to walk-ing through a minefield. You take a step and it’s OK. You take another—no problem. The third step you take and boom! You’re on you way to the airport in a body bag. 
     If you’re at the table and watch this play go down, you learn an important lesson—stay out of this guy’s way unless you have a monster. But monsters are few and far between and it seems as though Patrik, and others of his ilk, are in an awful lot of pots, so they’re difficult to avoid. This is why in Kill Phil we recommended that newer players overplay their big pairs and use a push (all-in) or fold pre-flop strategy with very specific guidelines, depending on stack size relative to the blinds, to neutralize the effectiveness of the “Phils” (and Patriks) of the world. When your chip stack is 10-times the cost of a round of blinds and antes or less, this strategy is close to optimal. 
     If you haven’t read Kill Phil yet, we recommend you do so, as it provides a solid framework for concepts discussed in this sequel.

Play a Lot of Speculative Hands Early
     If you’ve developed the ability to read hands and players really well, as many of these new-school experts have, you may be ready to employ similar tactics against your opponents. When you’ve got a deep stack, hands such as 64 suited or T7 suited can be played for a small raise. Also, you could see a flop by limping after several limpers with hands such as un-suited connectors or even hands such as Qs5s, if you’re on or near the button. If you hit the flop big (2-pair, trips, a straight, or a flush), you can win a large pot and perhaps double up. No one will suspect that a flop such as 7-5-3 rainbow helped you. After all, you’re not Alan Goehring, so it’s unlikely other players will suspect that you might have flopped a straight. If they’ve got a big over-pair or the nut flush draw with overcards, you might just bust them.

Playing Tight Early to Establish an Image
     If you’re uncomfortable with this strategy of playing a lot of hands and seeing a lot of flops because you’re afraid of being outplayed post-flop, there’s an effective alternative strategy: Play very few hands early to es-tablish a squeaky-tight image, so you can steal effec-tively later. With this strategy your range of playable hands might be as narrow as 55+, AQs+, and AK. Small pairs can be played for a small pre-flop raise, but you’ll be done with the hand unless you flop a set. With 99, TT, or JJ, if the pot’s been raised, you might consider just calling and trying either to flop a set or have a well-disguised overpair if three small cards flop. Play big pairs (QQ-AA) aggressively pre-flop by raising or re-raising. 
     Your objective with this game plan is to convince your opponents that you’re really solid when you get involved. You might want to show them aces or kings a couple of times to reinforce your tight image. By the 4th or 5th level, they should be convinced. Now you can pick your spots and make some aggressive moves with a high probability of success. 
     For example, coming over the top of a late-position raiser, with or without a caller, is highly likely to be successful. For hours the other players have seen you play tighter than a clam, so it’s unlikely they’ll suspect that you’re now stealing, until they see a marginal hand or two shown down. If this occurs (and you’re still alive), go back into your shell for a while before step-ping it up again.

Blind Stealing Early in the Tournament
     It’s important to distinguish between playing specu-lative hands early in the tournament and attempting to steal blinds with garbage. When the blinds are small, there’s not much reason for most players to steal. Say you’re playing in the WSOP Main Event with 10,000 chips and blinds of 25/50. You may have read some-where that you should raise from the button with any two cards in an attempt to pick up the blinds. Adding that 75 to your stack represents a paltry 0.75% in-crease, so most players should avoid getting involved with trash hands for such a minimal return. Unsuited hands without high cards or straight potential should generally be mucked. 
     Notice that I say “most players.” Some of the greats are an exception, but they have their sights set much higher than the 75 blinds. If the blinds give up, fine —they’ll lock up the small profit. But if they raise to 150 and get called, now it’s game on! Because these players are highly experienced and great hand readers, they’ll try to outplay their opponents on the flop and beyond, perhaps garnering significant chips in the process. If their opponent checks, they’ll bet virtually every time, instantly picking up the pot when their opponent misses on the flop (about 2/3 of the time). If they get resistance, they’ll use small bets, raises, or check raises to pare down hand ranges. Once they have a good feel for what a foe has, they’ll analyze the situation based on their extensive experience in similar situations. If they’ve got him beat, they’ll take an approach to maximize their profits; if they determine that he’s ahead, rather than turning tail and running for cover, they’ll size him up and if they think they can make a bet that he can’t call, they’ll do so without hesi-tation. Conversely, if they conclude that they’re beat and are unlikely to bet an opponent off his hand, they’ll fold early in the hand. On occasion, the pro might give up a small pot, but he’s much more likely to win far more pots than he loses. 
     The combination of a tournament expert’s unpre-dictability (he can have any two cards), astute reads, betting power, fearlessness, and position is often in-surmountable for intermediate players. Indeed, it’s these characteristics that make him great. He realizes that deep-stack NLHE pre-flop play doesn’t mean a lot. Expert players routinely give up pre-flop equity to get more value later in the hand. Intermediate players can’t do this. So although that button raise with a hand such as 64o may represent negative pre-flop equity, if you’re Alan Goehring or Patrik Antonius, it’s worth giving up this small amount of negative pre-flop equity in exchange for positive post-flop equity in deep-stack play.
     Poker is a zero-sum game. If one player has positive expected value (+EV), then another player must have an equal amount of negative expected value (-EV). If you’re the best or second-best player at the table, playing hands such as 64o may represent value, but otherwise it’s a losing play to get involved with such hands. Muck them and move on.
   When I suggest playing speculative hands early, I’m referring to hands such as small pairs, suited con-nectors, 1-gap suited connectors, and suited aces. The Rule of 5 and 10 (see page 49) and 3 and 6 (see page 66) will help you determine how much to invest with these hands. Unsuited connectors can also be limped with from the button and small blind for a small percentage of your stack. Mere mortals should avoid at-tempting blind steals with trash hands.

Blind Stealing Later in the Tournament
     After the first 5 or 6 levels, blind stealing becomes more lucrative. In fact, it becomes essential. This is es-pecially true once the antes commence. Factors that influence the frequency with which you can steal include:
     • Your chip stack relative to that of the big blind. Generally, the bigger his stack, the harder he’ll be to steal from.
     • The type of player in the big blind. Passive players who won’t re-raise without a top 10% hand are best. Aggressive players who frequently re-raise are tough to steal from effectively.
     • Your hand value. Obviously, the better your hand, the more likely you are to raise. Against better players who frequently re-raise, you need to upgrade the quality of your steal hands. Even so, against a frequent re-raiser you may need to move in with a hand such as 87s, 76s, etc. True, you’ll feel sick if he calls and shows you pocket aces, but you sometimes have to take risks such as this to regain control of your table. Unless he’s got a monster, your play will be successful.
     • Your table image. If you’ve stolen the blinds a few times recently, you should only steal-raise with a hand that can stand a re-raise. It’s sweet to wake up with a big pair or AK when you’ve stolen two hands recently. Most semi-aggressive players will play back at you the third time you raise.
     • If the player in the big blind has just won a nice pot, he’s a good candidate for a steal attempt. Players who have just won a pot and are now comfortable stack-wise are excellent targets. They’ll rarely get in-volved right away without a premium hand. If that player is a pro, though, ignore this advice. Some pros like to “play their rush” and will frequently play the next hand after dragging a big pot. If you ever play with Doyle Brunson, you can count on this happening.

The Big Move
     Sometimes early in a tournament, an opportunity presents itself to make a big move to build your stack. This may involve thinking outside the box. You need to know the odds of certain match-ups, have the courage of your convictions, and have a fair amount of risk-tolerance, but we’d argue that without these traits your chances of consistently doing well in tournaments is minimal anyway. 
     Early in the 2006 Aussie Millions Main Event, I encountered an unusual situation. I was seated at a tough table. Jason Gray, an Aussie pro, was seated on my left, followed by Mark Vos and a couple of accomplished, tough, online players. All players started with 20,000 in chips and there had been only minor fluctua-tions in the first hour of play when this hand come up.
     With blinds of 50/100, I was UTG with 7h6h and made it 225 to go. In early position, I like making small raises such as this with big hands and speculative hands alike. Jason Gray and Mark Vos both called, as did two of the tough Internet qualifiers. There was now 1,175 in the pot.
     The flop was Qh5h4c.
     I checked and Jason bet 1,000. Surprisingly, Vos and the two other players all smooth-called the 1,000. The action was now back to me and I paused for over a minute before acting. I had a flush draw and an open-ended-straight draw. Nine cards would make my flush, plus another six cards that would make a straight (eight straight cards minus the two straight cards that are hearts and have already been accounted for). With 15 possible outs (if you’re not familiar with counting outs, please read Kill Phil), I never considered folding.

Know the Odds
     My first instinct was to call, but then I surmised that there was an excellent chance another player had the nut flush draw. After all, four players had called a nearly pot-sized bet. If the nut flush draw was out there, then my outs would be dramatically slashed to the six non-hearts that would make the straight. I knew that my hand was at least even money against any outstanding hand except a set or a better flush draw. I reasoned that it was unlikely for any player, other than possibly Jason, to have a set, because with all the draws that the flop provided, it would be foolish for a set-holder not to protect his hand by raising on the flop. Remember, everyone in this pot was a good player. What would you do with my hand here? 
     With this background information, I came up with an action plan—I moved in. All 20,000! How did I arrive at this decision? First off, I knew the approximate odds of an all-in heads-up confrontation on the flop. I’d be: 

     • about 56% against an over-pair;
     • just over even money against any 2-pair; 
     • about 40% against a set;
     • about 37% against ace-little of hearts (Ah2h, Ah3h, etc.); 
     • about 35% against ace-big of hearts (AhKh, AhJh, etc.).

     Paradoxically, the hands against which I would fare worst heads-up were the nut flush draws; I had to raise any flush draw out of the pot, if indeed a hand such as this was out, as seemed probable. These seemed easiest to knock out with an all-in bet. Experienced players would realize, I figured, that they would be only 35% against 2-pair, and a 2-1 underdog against a set, my most likely holdings, and it would be a very tough call to make. Once I eliminated better flush draws, and given the unlikely event that a set was out based on the betting so far, I liked the odds I was getting. 
     There was already more than 5,000 in the pot. Any opponent who called would add another 19,000, so I was risking just under 20,000 to win 24,000, if called. I would be getting 1.2- to-1 on my money against an over-pair, or 2-pair, against both of which I was a favorite. Sure, Jason, or less likely one of the other players, could have an unsuspected set and I’d be a 1.5-to-1 underdog and only be getting 1.2-to-1, but this underlay was a risk I was willing to take. Most players won’t lay down sets, but in a situation such as this, some players might fold bottom set to an all-in bet this early in a major tournament, when they’ve only committed about 5% of their chips. Given my fold equity, a con-cept we’ll be discussing in more detail further on, I became convinced that moving in was my best play. I realized that if no one had a set, there was a good chance they’d all fold, and if I was unlucky enough to run into a set, I still had lots of outs. 
     Now put yourself in each of my opponents’ shoes as they decided what to do. Jason’s actual hand was AA without the ace of hearts. Faced with my all-in and with three players yet to act behind him, he quickly (and correctly) folded. He realized that he was either up against a set or a huge draw and was probably an underdog. Given the fact that one or more of the other players yet to act might also have his aces beat, his decision to fold was easy. 
     Mark Vos’ decision was even easier. Holding pocket tens, he quickly folded.
     The next player was faced with a real dilemma. He had 54, two small pair. He went into the tank for 6 minutes and finally called time on himself! I’ve never seen anyone else do this. He wanted a self-imposed deadline to make his decision. In the end, he also folded. He probably figured out that his hand wasn’t a favorite against the range of hands I could have and that he was virtually drawing dead if I had a set of queens. With only 1,225 invested and nearly 19,000 left, he reluctantly let his two pair go, rather than face possible elimination. By the way, if I’d had a set of queens I’d have played the hand the same way, so his trepidation over two small pair was warranted. Playing both your big hands and your bluffs in the same way is a recurring theme of this book. Unpredictability is the hallmark of all expert tournament players. Played the same way, your big hands protect your bluffs. 
     The final player to act did, indeed, have the nut flush draw—the ace and a small heart. From his perspective, it probably seemed as though he was up against a made hand (he knew who had the nut flush draw), most likely a set, against which he’d be about a 2-to-1 underdog—an easy fold. 
     From my perspective there were a number of positive spin-offs from this hand. Not only did I increase my stack by 25%, a big step toward the pivotal early accumulation of chips, I also achieved some psychological advantages, most notably what we refer to as “fold equity” and “fear equity.” The realization that all their chips might be threatened even this early in a tournament might make some of them think twice about entering pots in which I was involved. The combination of fold equity and fear equity is a powerful asset in no-limit hold ’em tournaments.

Description:
     Kill Phil was a revolutionary poker manual—its simplified yet potent strategies empowered even rank novices to compete against the world’s best poker players. 
     Kill Everyone begins where Kill Phil left off. Its perfect blend of real-time experience, poker math, and computational horsepower combine to create new concepts and advanced strategies never before seen in print for multi-table tournaments, Sit-n-Go’s, and satellites. 
     Kill Everyone explains how to choose the right strategy for the right game, provides the proper tactics, and introduces new weapons into a tournament-poker-player’s arsenal. These include:

• fear and fold equity
• equilibrium plays
• bubble factors
• endgame strategies
• optimal heads-up play
• and much much more!

     Unlike Kill Phil, which was 90% pre-flop strategy, Kill Everyone goes all the way. In the end, you’ll know how to accumulate chips early, navigate through the middle stages, and perfect your play on the bubble and at the final table. This book is for anyone serious about playing tournament poker, both live and online. And for cash-game players, a bonus chapter, penned by online cash-game ace and 2007 WSOP bracelet winner Mark Vos, helps you develop your short-handed no-limit hold ’em cash game.

Reviews/Media Mentions:

PokerRoad.com Interview with Lee.

Pokernews.com interview with Lee.

..."This sequel to 'Kill Phil', is not a handbook on how to be a homicidal maniac, but it is a guide on how to be a stone cold killer at the poker table. 'Kill Everyone' is the most compact and comprehensive guide to No-Limit Hold’em tournament play I have come across."
     —Pocket 5s

..."This book, with some heady, heavy stuff, contains many charts and tables, a minimum of heavy mathematics and a trainload of food for thought requiring slow reading, much note-taking and underlining and patience to absorb some of the most important poker advice you'll ever get."
     —Howard Schwartz

"The long awaited sequel to 'Kill Phil' has finally been published. Where 'Kill Phil' provided an effective long-ball strategy for neophyte tournament poker players to compete against expert players, 'Kill Everyone' takes the 'Killers of Phils' [who by now should have had a lot of playing experience] to another level of play. This second book by Lee Nelson and his new collaborators [Tysen Streib and Kim Lee] details some very advanced tournament poker concepts and strategies. It is also based on the modern game [also sometimes called the 'new school'] of very strong aggression. Where 'Kill Phil' emphasized a long-ball strategy due to its target audience being beginning tournament players, this book teaches small-ball play in the early stages of a tournament, and provides further analysis of the long-ball tactics introduced in 'Kill Phil'. Thus, you now have both strategies in your arsenal to be utilized as befits the situation."
     —Amazon.com review by P. Wong

"'Kill Phil' was a breakthrough book that everyone with an interest in tournament no-limit hold'em ought to read ... 'Kill Everyone' is about as revolutionary as its predecessor, and at its best, perhaps even more so. There is great information in this book and it deserves to be read."
     —Nick Christenson, Poker Player